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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR LIFE-
ENDANGERING CORPORATE
CONDUCT
W. ALLEN SPURGEON* AND TERENCE P. FAGAN**
INTRODUCTION
Business corporations supply modern society with the necessities
and comforts of life. Benefiting from the collective capital of many
shareholders and laws favoring the artificial business entity, corpora-
tions are uniquely able to provide goods and services to the public. Cor-
porations produce our transportation vehicles, process the food we eat,
construct the buildings in which we live and work, and make a myriad
of goods we use everyday. The manufacturing process provides employ-
ment and also profoundly affects our environment. Corporations are
thus an essential element of modern life.
While corporations have dramatically improved the United States'
standard of living, this progress has not been without social costs. Some
corporate activity endangers life itself. Unsafe cars, drugs, and food ad-
ditives endanger the health of consumers. Hazardous working condi-
tions and toxic chemicals used in the manufacturing process pose life
and health risks to industrial workers. Water and air pollution and the
dumping of toxic chemicals threaten public health.
Such simultaneous beneficial and detrimental aspects of corporate
conduct present lawmakers with the challenge of curtailing socially
harmful activity without stifling the industrial process. Criminal law
may operate as one device to restrain corporations from engaging in un-
reasonably harmful conduct. In the most recent attempt to codify and
reform the Federal Criminal Code,1 the Senate Judiciary Committee
included an offense which would have punished conduct, manifesting
* Shareholder, Spurgeon, Haney & Howbert, P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado; Assis-
tant United States Attorney and First Assistant United States Attorney, District of Colorado,
1970-75; J.D., Denver University, 1965; B.A. Stanford University, 1959.
** J.D., Northwestern University, 1981; A.B., University of Chicago, 1978.
I The most recent bill of this nature and the one that will be the subject of this article is
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 1722]. See SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, S. REP. No. 96-553, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1979). For earlier versions of this reform effort, see Hearings on S 1453 Before
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an extreme indifference to or an unjustified disregard for human life,
which knowingly places human life in imminent danger of death.
Because criminal law represents society's moral condemnation of
certain activity, such an endangerment offense will most effectively de-
ter corporate behavior if society casts moral blame upon life-endanger-
ing conduct. When corporate activity imperils human life to a degree
substantially greater than the societal benefits it confers, that activity
becomes morally blameworthy and properly subject to criminal sanc-
tions. Even though conduct may be morally condemnable, criminal
sanctions should be invoked only when the threat of punishment will
deter behavior or fulfill a retributive function. Even though the corpo-
rate form reduces their impact, criminal sanctions do serve as a deter-
rent. Thus, an endangerment offense providing added criminal liability
would provide corporations with an incentive to conform to social
norms.
This article will analyze both the efficacy of utilizing criminal law
to shape corporate behavior and the specific provisions of the proposed
endangerment offense. Part I establishes the existence of socially harm-
ful corporate conduct and the need for government regulation. This
section will also elaborate the history and provisions of the endanger-
ment offense. Part II considers whether corporate life-endangering con-
duct is morally blameworthy so as to be properly subject to criminal
sanctions and whether punishing such conduct would have a different
impact. This section attempts to illustrate some of the social policy
problems associated with criminalizing some life-endangering activity.
While Part II focuses on theoretical and policy questions, Part III dis-
cusses the implementation of criminal sanctions in a practical context.
It analyzes the actual deterrent effect of inflicting criminal penalties on
a corporation and its employees. Finally, Part III briefly considers
whether the Senate Judiciary Committee's construction of the endan-
germent statute would reach most morally blameworthy and socially
harmful conduct.
I. LIFE ENDANGERING ACTIVITY AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. SOCIALLY HARMFUL CORPORATE ACTIVITY
As noted above, while corporations are responsible for the techno-
logical advancement of society, corporate activity also imposes serious
social costs. In recent decades, these costs, in the form of deleterious
effects on the public health, safety, and welfare, have become increas-
the Senate Comm. on theJuddag, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on S I Before the Senate
Comm. on theJudiiaq, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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ingly apparent. Corporate life-endangering activity can be divided into
three categories: occupational harm, dangers to consumers, and deterio-
ration of the environment affecting the general public. 2 A survey of the
most notable recent occurrences in each of the areas illustrates the effect
of such corporate conduct. 3
Millions of Americans are exposed to health and safety risks while
they work. Before the advent of the Occupational Health and Safety
Act 4 as many as 100,000 people died annually from occupational dis-
eases.5 After the Act's passage in 1970, federal health officials have esti-
mated that 25 percent of the work force is exposed to regulated toxic
substances and that 880,000 workers are exposed to carcinogenic chemi-
cals. 6 Substances such as asbestos 7 and vinyl chloride" used in many
industrial processes, cause widespread illness to those workers who use
them.
Some corporate activity also poses a danger to consumers. One
study estimates that "approximately 20 million Americans are injured
each year in the home as a result of accidents involving unsafe consumer
products. These accidents result in about 30,000 deaths and 110,000
permanently disabling injuries."9 In some cases, a single product with a
2 This trichotomy of harms is articulated in Schrager & Short, Towarda Sociology of Organi-
zational Cn'me, 25 SOC. PROB. 407 (1978).
3 This survey of incidents is not meant to be a parade of horribles but rather aims to
define the general parameters of corporate endangering activities. Many of the examples
which follow will be used later in the article for analytical purposes.
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
5 The 1972 President's Commission on Occupational Safety and Health compiled this
statistic, which was reported in M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 10 (1980).
6 Bronson, Workers'Right to Know, Wall St. J., July 1, 1977, at 4, col. 2-4 (quoted in Does
Business Value Human Life?, 22 BUSINESS & Soc'Y REV. 44, 51 (1977)).
7 Studies by the U.S. Health Service in the 1930s demonstrated that asbestos workers had
a significant incidence of asbestosis (a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs) and pneumoconio-
sis (a chronic reaction to the inhalation of dust). See SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE CRIME 23 (Comm. Print No. 10
1980) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. ON CRIME]. See also A. LANZA, W. MCCONNELL & J.
FEHRENEL, EFFECTS OF INHALATION OF ASBESTOS ON THE LUNGS OF ASBESTOS WORKERS
I (Public Health Service Pub., Vol. 50, No. 1,Jan. 1, 1935). Research conducted in the 1960s
confirmed that asbestos constituted a health hazard. See Selikoff, Asbestos Exposure and Neopla-
sa, J.A.M.A., April 6, 1964, at 22 and note 88 infra. Although industry knew of these health
risks, few corporations took steps to rectify the problem. OSHA now regulates the permissible
number of asbestos fibers in the ambient environment of the workplace, a standard that in-
dustry opposed. See SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra at 25.
8 Vinyl chloride is mainly used in the manufacture of plastics, an industry that ac-
counted for one percent of the gross national product in 1976. SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL AcT., S. REP. No. 94-698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1976). This chemical substance has been associated with liver cancer in workers and birth
defects. Id.
9 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., CENTER FOR
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, BENEFITS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 24; (Comm. Print 1980) (citing
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design or testing defect may seriously endanger many consumers. For
example, the Ford Pinto fuel system was shown to be susceptible to ex-
ploding upon near-impact at certain speeds.' 0 The Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company marketed the radial "500" tire which often proved
faulty, causing many accidents and injuries.II The Richardson-Mervell
Pharmaceutical Company produced the drug MER/29, designed to re-
duce cholesterol, which in fact had many harmful side effects.' 2
In addition to conduct which endangers the life and health of em-
ployees and consumers, corporate activity also imperils the general pop-
ulace by damaging the environment. Toxic chemicals, in particular,
pose a grave health risk. In 1976, two million chemical compounds ex-
isted, with nearly a thousand new chemicals introduced into the market
each year, ultimately entering the environment through use or dispo-
Dardis, Aronson & Lin, Cost Benfft Analysi of Flammability Standards, 60 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
695 (Nov. 1978)).
10 In 1971-76 model Pintos, the metal fuel tank was located behind the real axle. Rear-
impact collision studies have shown that at collisions of moderate speeds, the fuel tank is
carried forward, impacting with the rear-axle housing or mounting bolts. SUBCOMM. ON
CRIME, supra note 7, at 9. As of 1978, rear-end collisions resulting in fires had caused 26
deaths and burn injuries to 24 other persons. Id. at 10 (citing NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF DEFECTS AND INVESTIGATION ENFORCEMENT, INVES-
TIGATION REPORT, PHASE I, Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-End Collisions of
Sub-compact Passenger Cars, 1971-76 Ford Pinto, 1975-76 Mercu,7 Bobcat 4 (May 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as INVESTIGATION REPORT]. Ford allegedly knew the fuel system was defective, but
declined to make a safety improvement at cost of $11 per car. SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra
note 7, at 9 (referring to Dowie, How FordPut Two Million Firetraps on Wheels, 23 Bus. & Soc'Y
REV. 46 (1977). Dowie reportedly obtained the safety cost figure from an internal Ford mem-
orandum, id. at 1. In 1980, an Indiana jury acquitted Ford of reckless homicide charges
stemming from the burn deaths of three young women. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1980, § 1, at
1, col. 1.
11 Firestone became the first American firm to manufacture steel-belted radial tires in
large quantities for the original equipment market. In 1976, four years after production be-
gan, the Center for Auto Safety, a consumer organization, noticed that a disproportionate
number of complaints involved the Firestone 500. On the order of the National Highway
Safety Traffic Administration in 1978, Firestone produced a list of 213 accidents associated
with the tire. SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 3-5. A subsequent congressional investi-
gation concluded, "Accidents attributable to the '500' number in the thousands, injuries in
the hundreds, and known fatalities as of August 1978, 34 ... . Id. at 5 (quoting SUBCOMM.
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE SAFETY OF FIRESTONE 500 STEEL BELTED RADIAL
TIRES 1 (Comm. Print 1978). In 1978, at the behest of the National Highway Traffic &
Safety Administration, Firestone agreed to recall some 7.5 million radial tires. SUBCOMM. ON
CRIME, supra note 7, at 8.
12 In the development of this drug, a lab technician noted that test animals were develop-
ing eye problems and losing weight. When the technician reported these results to her super-
visors, she was told to falsify this data. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 167 (1975). Thus,
the company marketed the drug in the early 1960s when at least some of its employees knew
that it could cause such harmful side-effects as "interruption of normal sexual functioning,
loss of hair, and the development of eye cataracts." M. CUNARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5,
at 265 (citations omitted).
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sal. 13 In Niagara Falls, New York, chemcial contamination caused the
evacuation of many homes.14 In Hopewell, Virginia, production of the
chemical Kepone by the Allied Chemical Company deteriorated em-
ployees' health and damaged the aquatic environment of the James
River.15 While toxic chemicals may harm significant numbers of peo-
ple, corporate activity may also endanger a confined and concentrated
community. For example, at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, a solid waste
dam built by a mining company collapsed, flooding the valley below
and causing destruction of life and property. 16
These examples of occupational, consumer and environmental
harm illustrate the need to prevent socially harmful conduct. Where a
private right of action exists, the threat of a compensatory damage judg-
ment may deter corporations, who aim to maximize profit, from engag-
ing in certain harmful conduct. However, sporadic civil damage suits
may not effectively alter behavior. In addition, market pressures may
prevent corporations seeking growth and profit from taking voluntary,
13 S. REP. No. 94-698 at 3. Dr. David Rail, director of the National Institute of Environ-
mental Health Sciences of the National Institute of Health, noted that "[m]any of these com-
pounds are toxic to man in relatively low concentrations. Man is assaulted by these
compounds alone and in combination from multiple sources. This problem constilutesposibly the
major health hazard of this decade. " Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
14 The Hooker Chemical Company began using the uncompleted Love Canal site as a
burial place for chemical wastes in 1947, the year the site was purchased. By 1952, the com-
pany had dumped 22,000 tons of chemicals there. SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 14,
15. In 1953, Hooker deeded the property to the Niagara Falls Board of Education, which
built an elementary school adjacent to the canal site. In the deed, Hooker disclaimed liability
for any injury or death resulting from its disposal. Id. In 1976, chemicals began to seep into
some basements of the 200 homes which had been built in the vicinity of the canal. In 1978,
the New York Department of Health investigated residents' complaints of "abnormal num-
bers of miscarriages, birth defects, cases of cancer, and a variety of illnesses." Id. at 16. The
department found that 82 chemical compounds had entered the air, water, and soil, 11 of
which were actual or suspected carcinogens. By July 1979, President Carter had declared the
canal site a disaster area, and 263 families had left their homes. Id.
15 Workers producing the pesticide contracted such health problems as severe tremors,
diminished ability to walk or stand, "weight loss, liver tenderness and enlargement, brain
damage, chest pains, personality changes [and] eye flutters," Stone, A Slap on the Wristfor the
Kepone Mob, 22 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 4, 6 (1977). Chemical dust arising from the manufactur-
ing process was found to have travelled from the plant "at least sixteen miles in the air and
sixty-four miles in the water." Id. Since Kepone had found its way into the James River via
the Hopewell sewage system, shellfish and fish became contaminated, causing the governor of
Virginia to close 100 miles of the river to fishing. Id.
16 The Buffalo Mining Company dumped slag from its coal mining operations to form a
barrier behind which the company could store water needed to prepare the coal for shipment.
SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 2. In February 1972, the reservoir behind the solid
waste dam rose to within inches of the crest. The company cut a spillway as a precautionary
measure, but issued no public warnings. Early the next morning the dam collapsed, sending
a 20-30 foot tidal wave of waste and solids downstream. The flood killed 125 people and
destroyed 1,000 homes. Id. at 2-3. See also M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 234. In
June 1974, 600 of the Buffalo Creek residents, who had brought suit against the mining com-
pany's parent corporations, were awarded 13.5 million dollars in an out-of-court settlement.
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but costly, safety steps if other members of their industry do not also
follow the same course of action. 17
Given the free enterprise ethic in America, government would
avoid interference with corporate activity by means of regulatory laws if
corporations were able to avoid significant social harm. However, the
perceived inability of business to regulate its own activity led to govern-
ment regulation in the nineteenth century. Due to the scope of inter-
state commerce and the need for uniformity, the federal government
became active in monitoring business activity. Modern comprehensive
federal public welfare offenses18 first appeared in 1938 with the passage
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.' 9 In the last two decades, Con-
gress has enacted laws to protect employees, 20 consumers, 21 and the en-
vironment. 22 Such legislation typically provides for administrative,23
civil,24 and criminal25 remedies and sanctions.
Despite this existing regime of regulation, some corporate acts con-
tinue to result in societal harm. Senators in the Ninety-Sixth Congress
responded to the problem by introducing legislation criminalizing
knowing life-endangering conduct by corporations.
B. PROVISIONS AND HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERMENT OFFENSE
Section 1617 of the 1979 Senate Federal Criminal Code Reform
Act would have penalized a person when "he engages in conduct that he
knows places another person in imminent danger of death or bodily in-
jury, and (1) his conduct in the circumstances manifests an extreme in-
difference to human life, or (2) his conduct in the circumstances
17 This proposition can be proved by demonstrating that its obverse is true. If one com-
pany deviates from ethical or legal practices, thereby reaping a benefit, other companies in
the same industry will also engage in the same behavior. Clinard and Yeager point out that
illegal pricefixing tends to be industry wide. M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, suPra note 5, at 62.
These authors also cite a 1953 study by Lane showing that in a given industry, the percentage
of firms violating the law varies greatly according to community. Id. at 63 (citing Lane, Why
Businessmen Violate the Law, 44 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 151 (1953)).
18 Professor Sayre first coined this phrase in a 1933 article. See Sayre, Public We/fare Of-
feres, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
19 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1938). Initial federal regulatory laws actually began with the
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. However, the provisions of the 1938
Act were much more comprehensive.
20 See, e.g., Occupational Health & Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
21 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1972); National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1966).
22 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1977). Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 etseq. (1977); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
23 For example, the Occupational Health and Safety Act provides administrators of the
Act to issue citations, 29 U.S.C. § 658, and to enforce administrative penalties, id. § 659.
24 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2069; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
25 Se, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2615(b); Occupational Health and
Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. 666, and statutes collected in note 42 infra.
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manifests an unjustified disregard for human life." '26
The concept of an endangerment offense is not new. In formulat-
ing the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute established an
offense for reckless conduct.2 7 The National Commission on Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws suggested a similar offense, 28 and New York
has enacted two statutes punishing reckless, endangering conduct.
29
These offenses impose criminal liability in two contexts. First, as many
criminal codes specifically penalize certain life-endangering conduct, the
endangerment offense constitutes an additional penalty.3 0  Second,
when a person's conduct did not violate a specific statute yet still placed
lives in danger, the offense created general liability where none had pre-
viously existed. 3 ' In each of these previous models of endangerment,
recklessness constituted the culpable state of mind.
In the early draft of the 1979 Senate bills, S. 1722 and S. 1723, the
Judiciary Committee relied on these early endangerment examples.
The initial version of section 1617 proscribed reckless conduct that
placed the life of another in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury when such conduct concurrently violated any statute designed to
protect public health and safety.32 However, after business representa-
26 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 561-62.
27 Section 201.11 of the Model Penal Code provides: "A person is guilty of reckless con-
duct if he: (a) recklessly engaged in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury ... " ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.11 (Tent.
Draft No. 9 1959).
28 Reckless Endangerment.
(1) Offense. A person is guilty of an offense if he creates a substantial risk of seri-
ous bodily injury or death to another. The offense is a Class C felony if the circum-
stances manifest his extreme indifference to the value of human life. Otherwise it is a
Class A misdemeanor. There is risk within the meaning of this section if the potential for
harm exists, whether or not a particular person's safety is actually jeopardized.
(2) Jurisdiction. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense defined in this section
under paragraphs (a) or (1) of section 201 or when the offense is committed in the course
of committing or in immediate flight from the commission of any other offense over
which federal jurisdiction exists.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT § 1613
178 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
29 N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 120.20 (McKinney 1967) provides: "A person is guilty of reckless
endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person."
N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 120.25 provides: "A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the
first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person."
30 For example, the National Commission noted that federal law penalizes violation of
federal safety regulations. When endangerment occurs in the course of such a violation, the
endangerment provision serves as an additional means of prosecution. See FINAL REPORT,
supra note 28, at 178.
31 A person could be liable for death or injury resulting from the operation of dams, nu-
clear facilities, or transportation facilities. Id. at 178.
32 See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S 1722 and S 1723 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11182-83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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tives and public interest groups presented their views of the legislation,
the Judiciary Committee made several changes limiting the scope of sec-
tion 1617.
The committee first changed the standard of culpability from reck-
lessness to knowledge. Business interests argued that a reckless standard
would unnecessarily impose liability upon corporations for a broad
range of problems. Irving R. Shapiro, chairman of E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Company, contended that juries would associate recklessness
with no guilty state of mind and would therefore render decisions actu-
ally based on a strict liability standard.33 Public interest groups, how-
ever, pointed out that recklessness is a state of mind, for the standard
encompassed conduct in "gross deviation from the standard of concern
that a reasonable person would have exercised in the situation." 34 Ap-
parently persuaded by the business arguments, the Judiciary Committee
adopted the standard of knowledge, requiring that a defendant "must
be aware or believe that his conduct is substantially certain to place
another in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" to violate
the endangerment provision.35
Second, the Judiciary Committee limited the scope of the endan-
germent by adding the requirement that the knowing conduct must evi-
dence extreme indifference to or an unjustified disregard for human life.
These qualifying requirements serve to limit the offense to "especially
aggravated situations."'36 A defendant acts with "extreme indifference"
when his conduct is so outrageous that any absence of actual harm is
merely a "quirk of fate."'37 A person's conduct may evidence an "unjus-
tified disregard" for human life when the "substantial likelihood of caus-
ing death or serious bodily injury is wholly disproportionate to the
benefit of the conduct."38
Finally, the Judiciary Committee also narrowed the scope of the
endangerment offense by limiting its applicability to concurrent viola-
tions of specific regulatory offenses. As originally framed, conduct
would be subject to liability under the endangerment offense if that con-
33 Id. at 10087-88 (statement of Irving Shapiro). Shapiro testified on behalf of the Busi-
ness Roundtable, an association of 192 large corporations. Id. at 10072.
34 Id. at 9945 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann).
35 Se S. REP. No. 96-553 at 562.
36 Id. at 563.
37 Id.
38 Id. Business concerns influenced the definition of "unjustified disregard." The Business
Roundtable criticized the initial endangerment provision as an attempt "simplistically to deal
with a whole variety of complicated 'endangerment' problems inherent in a technical soci-
ety." Id. at 10075. By introducing a balancing test of dangers and benefits, the committee's
adoption of the unjustified disregard requirement recognized the difficulty of penalizing en-
dangering conduct. For an application and analysis of this standard in the context of corpo-
rate activity, see notes 74-96 & accompanying text infra.
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duct concurrently violated any statute "designed to protect public
health or safety." 39 During the hearings, various groups criticized such
a broad endangerment provision as leading to unwarranted
prosecutorial discretion4 and to a proliferation of litigation over which
statutes were designed to protect public "health and safety."'41 In re-
sponse to these criticisms, the Judiciary Committee specifically enumer-
ated the regulatory statutes which would confer liability under section
1617.42 The committee concluded that these offenses were the "most
appropriate and important from a practical standpoint for application
of the endangerment concept."
4 3
The Judiciary Committee classified a violation of the endanger-
ment offense as a felony. Conduct evidencing an extreme indifference to
human life was punishable by up to five years in prison with all other
conduct violating the statute subject to up to two years of incarcera-
tion.44
The 1979 Act proposed other changes in sanctions that might have
affected corporations convicted of the endangerment offense. When the
convicted defendant was an organization, the proposed Act authorized
fines of up to one million dollars for a felony.45 In addition to a fine, the
Act invested the trial judge with the power to authorize restitution to a
victim, when the defendant had been found guilty of an offense causing
bodily injury.46
39 See Hearings, supra note 32, at 11183.
40 Id. at 9985 (testimony of Professor William Greenhalgh on behalf of the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section).
41 Id. at 10087 (testimony of Irving Shapiro for the Business Roundtable).
42 Section 1617 now imposes liability only when conduct also violates any of the following
criminal offenses:
(I) The Environmental Pollution offenses of
(1) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1);
(2) The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(I);
(3) The Toxic Substances Control Act 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b);
(4) The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1316(b)(1);
(5) The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) or (d)(2);
(6) The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1);
(7) Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b);
(8) The Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4910(a)(1); and
(9) The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407;
(II) The Federal Mine Safety & Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(c);
(III) The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e);
(IV) The Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1264(a);
(V) The Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(o and 263a(h), or
(VI) The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333.
43 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 564.
44Id.
45 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 2201(b)(2).
46 S. 1722, supra note 1, § 2006(a)(1). This section allowed the court to order restitution
for the payment of medical services, provided that such payment "not exceed such portion of
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
The endangerment provision as it related to corporate conduct rep-
resented another attempt by Congress to prevent corporate activity
which imperiled human life. In order to analyze the efficacy and im-
pact of such a criminal statute, the purposes of criminal law and the
general application of criminal sanctions to corporations must be con-
sidered.
II. MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS AND THE PUNISHMENT OF LIFE-
ENDANGERING CORPORATE AcTIvITY
The goal of law is to define the permissible parameters of conduct
in society. Premised on current social needs and notions of morality, law
structures, prescribes, and limits our business, social, and familial activ-
ity. While law aims to establish acceptable norms of conduct, the ad-
ministrative, civil, and criminal branches of law provide a means of
insuring that individuals act in accordance with social norms.
When a corporation violates a regulatory statute, an administrative
agency may issue a citation or negotiate a consent decree. Thus, an
administrative agency may order conformity with the behavior man-
dated by regulatory laws or implementing regulations. When a corpora-
tion tortiously injures an individual, that person may seek compensation
by bringing a private civil action. Assuming that corporations act ra-
tionally to maximize profits, the monetary compensation it must pay for
a tortious wrong serves to deter the corporation from acting in a similar
manner in the future. Activity which becomes costly will be avoided.
When corporate conduct not only inflicts injury, but also violates a
criminal statute, the state may punish the corporation or the responsible
agents. The possibility of punishment acts as a deterrent of aberrant
behavior.
This general description of the remedies and sanctions of adminis-
trative, civil, and criminal law illustrates that all three branches of law
aim to confrom behavior. All three branches could be used to reach
life-endangering corporate conduct. The Senate Judiciary Committee's
attempt to criminalize endangering activity represents .a judgment that
criminal sanctions would serve a particular role, unfulfilled by either
administrative or civil law. Thus, the first inquiry in assessing the en-
dangerment offense is whether the criminalization of life-endangering
corporate activity is theoretically consistent with the goals and purposes
of criminal law. If the activity does not fall within the criminal law,
punishing such activity would be unjust to the corporation and reduce
the victim's medical expenses ... as the court determines can be ascertained without unduly
complicating or prolonging the sentencing process." Id. See alto S. REP. No. 96-553 at 952.
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the general force of criminal sanctions. To answer this inquiry, we must
first outline the purposes of criminal law.
A. PURPOSES AND GOALS OF CRIMINAL LAW
While civil and criminal law are much alike, two factors particu-
larly distinguish criminal law. First, criminality attaches to conduct
that is particularly morally blameworthy.47 Society has long criminal-
ized such immoral and deviant behavior as murder, rape, and theft.
However, because tort law also provides a remedy for these wrongs,48
immorality of the conduct must not itself confer criminality. Criminal
law embodies a greater sense of moral outrage by society. Thus, a crime
may be defined as "conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place,
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemna-
tion of the community. ' 49 A formal judgment of guilt manifests this
condemnation; social stigma, therefore, attaches to the convicted.50
Generally, society does not place as much moral blame on an individual
against whom a civil judgment is entered.
A second distinguishing feature of criminal law is that criminal
sanctions constitute punishment. While punitive damages at civil law
may punish a wrongdoer in the sense of imposing harm or deprivation, 51
criminal sanctions represent punishment imposed by the collective force
of society through the state. Because of society's moral condemnation of
the wrongdoer's conduct, criminal sanctions always represent punish-
ment.52 Thus, the state's power to convict and punish an individual
gains legitimacy from the moral blameworthiness attached to the indi-
47 Although reasonable persons may differ as to whether particular conduct is moral, ref-
erence to morality in this article shall mean behavior in accordance with the accepted stan-
dard of right and normative conduct in society. See Oleck, Renedies for Abuses of Corporate
Staus, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 474-75 (1973).
48 See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
49 Hart, The Aimns ofthe Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405 (1958).
50 Herbert Packer stated that society views conviction itself as punishment because of the
stigma attached to the guilty. Packer observes that after a conviction, if the criminal is a
"respectable member of the community who wants the good opinion of his fellows and of
society, he has in a relevant sense already suffered some punishment." H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968).
Ball and Friedman also noted, "Labelling conduct as 'criminal' may change the public
attitude toward the man who breaks the law .... ." Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197, 211
(1965).
51 Hart noted that with the "exception of death, exactly the same kinds of unpleasant
consequences, objectively considered, can be and are visited upon unsuccessful defendants in
civil proceedings." Hart, supra note 49, at 403-04. Civil defendants are subject to body execu-
tion and punitive monetary damages. Id. at 404.
52 Punishment by the state coupled with the moral stigma of a condemnation thus differ-
entiates criminal from civil law. As Packer points out, "Not all punishment is criminal pun-
ishment but all criminal punishment is punishment. Punitive damages imposed in a civil suit
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vidual's conduct.53
This moral basis also forms a constituent element of the purposes of
criminal law, which are generally recognized to be deterrence and retri-
bution. The threat of incarceration or a penalty by fine deters the po-
tential or actual wrongdoer from violating established norms of
behavior.54 In addition to actual punishment, the social opprobrium
associated with conviction serves as a deterrent.5 5 Society has formal-
ized this social stigma by placing disabilities on criminals that extend
beyond the term of actual punishment.
Both actual and social sanctions potentially shape behavior. Ball
and Friedman have noted that social scientists agree that sanctions "can
effectuate policy considerations by influencing what a person thinks he
ought to do or what he wants to do in a particular situation." 56 Sanc-
tions act as an external restraint on behavior when an actor avoids a
course of conduct simply because a statute prohibits that conduct. In
this sense, moral blame may not attach to the conduct itself. However,
punishment is legitimate because society associates some moral blame
with the violation of statutes and regulations.
57
constitute punishment but not criminal punishment. . . .Punishment is a concept; criminal
punishment is a legal fact." H. PACKER, siupra note 50, at 35.
53 Some theorists place less emphasis on the moral basis of criminal law while highlighting
the rational end which the criminal law attempts to attain. Accordingly, "[t]he legislature
simply wants certain things done and certain other things not done because it believes that
the doing or the not doing of them will secure some ultimate social advantage, and not at all
because it thinks the immediate conduct involved is either rightful or wrongful in itself."
Hart, supra note 49, at 417. Under this view, criminal law is an instrument by which govern-
ment manipulates behavior for social ends. See Ball & Friedman, supra note 50, at 210-11.
Thus, the power of the state is used to regulate individuals and entities in their daily func-
tions.
The differences between the moral and rational theories are few but important. Legisla-
tures presumably only prohibit socially harmful conduct. If morality consists of the standard
of right and proper conduct, actions which promote and benefit the social welfare would be
moral. Conversely, actions detracting from the social good would be immoral and discour-
aged. When criminal law prohibits certain socially harmful behavior, moral and rational
goals converge.
The major difference between the two theories is that morally based sanctions may have
a greater impact on individuals' conduct, an impact discussed at note 71 & accompanying
text injfa.
54 See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pr=r. L. REv. 21, 37 (1957).
55 Packer notes that in addition to the fear of pain and loss of liberty, "[f]eelings of shame
resulting from the social disgrace of being punished as a criminal are feared also." H. PACK-
ER, supra note 50, at 42.
56 Ball & Friedman, supra note 50, at 75.
57 [E]ven when the activity proscribed by law is not in itself morally wrong, the know-
ing violation of the law may be morally blameworthy. If a statute regulates and struc-
tures important social behavior and institutions, there is probably a moral duty to obey
that law, at least in a reasonably just society.
Developments in the Lawo--Corporate Crinm: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through CriminalSanctions,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1237-38 (1979).
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Criminal sanctions may also act as an internal restraint on behav-
ior. In such a case, the actor conforms his behavior to a given standard,
not because he fears the consequences of nonconformity, but because he
believes the standard to be right.58 When an actor knows that society
will judge certain behavior as morally blameworthy, the actor internally
establishes a course of action which will not subject him to blame or
cause him to make conscious choices as to the propriety of his behavior.
Thus, the actor does not need to follow a statute book to determine if his
behavior is acceptable.
In addition to deterrence, criminal law also serves a retributive
function. Retribution is entirely premised on the moral blameworthi-
ness of the conduct: the state imposes sanctions because the actor has
harmed society. It is therefore "morally fitting that a person who does
wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.1 59 Thus, punish-
ment for moral reasons serves to satisfy social passions for vengeance. 60
If the state did not fulfill this function, individuals would attempt to
gain revenge themselves, thereby disrupting rule by law.61 Such disrup-
tion would also take place if the state punished behavior not morally
condemnable. If a consensus of society does not view the actor's conduct
as immoral, punishment becomes undeserved and unjust. Undeserved
punishment leads to a lack of respect for the criminal justice system.
B. MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS AND CORPORATE LIFE-ENDANGERING
CONDUCT
The distinctive feature of criminal law is the moral blameworthi-
ness attached to the conviction for and punishment of proscribed con-
duct. Criminal sanctions seek to deter actors from engaging in behavior
they believe to be wrong or that society condemns. The punishment of
58 Packer divides deterrence into conscious and unconscious components. In explaining
the unconscious aspect, he states that the "existence of a 'threat' helps to create patterns of
conforming behavior and thereby to reduce the number of occasions on which the choice of a
criminal act presents itself." H. PACKER, suipra note 50, at 43. Thus, he contends that we
become unconsciously impelled to do the right thing and abide by the law. See also id. at 65.
59 See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, PHILOSOPHICAL REV., Jan. 1955, at 3, 4-5 (quoted in
Posner, Retributions and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (1980)).
60 Fisse, The Social Poli of Corporate Criminal Responsibilily, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 361, 406
(1978).
61 In discussing the concept of retribution in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Mr.
Justice Stewart stated,
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in
the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the sta-
bility of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society
is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve,"
then there are sown the seeds of anarchy--of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). For an analytical discussion of retribution, see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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less than immoral behavior weakens the force of criminal law. Each of
these propositions presumes first that the actor views the conduct as im-
moral and second that society can reach a consensus as to the immoral-
ity of certain behavior. When applied to corporate life-endangering
conduct, these presumptions become problematic. 62
While the artificial entity of the corporation has no soul or con-
science of its own to help it evaluate morality of conduct, the human
agents who operate the corporation do have the capacity to judge right
from wrong. However, the organizational structure and competitive en-
vironment of the corporation may influence the moral perspective of
businessmen. In his pioneering study of white collar crime, Sutherland
pointed out that "criminal behavior is learned in association with those
who define it favorably. . .[a] person in an appropriate situation en-
gages in such behavior if, and only if, the weight of favorable definitions
exceeds the weight of unfavorable definitions. '63 The corporation is an
association and community that favorably defines behavior that pro-
duces economic gain for the corporation.64 In some situations, the cor-
porate profit motive overrides the individual's preconceived notions of
morality. In 1932, the president of General Motors declined to install
safety glass in new model cars, a step which would have reduced the
incidence of injury in collisions, on the ground that "[W]e are not a
charitable institution-we are trying to make a profit for our sharehold-
ers." 65 A 1976 survey found that respondent executives believed their
colleagues "would not refuse orders to market off-standard and possibly
dangerous products."'66 When corporate goals conflict with individual
moral standards, the individual often faces the choice of compromising
or losing employment. Thus, in the MER/29 drug incident, the em-
ployee had to choose between her job and falsifying her experimental
data.67
Despite the fact that the corporate profit motive may encourage
individuals to act in ways which society judges to be immoral, to assert
62 The discussion of this section is concerned with a theoretical application of the concepts
of moral blameworthiness and deterrence. Part III, infra, discusses the practical aspects of
deterrence by considering whether criminal sanctions have an actual impact on corportions
and corporate agents.
63 E. SUTHERLAND, WHrrE COLLAR CRIME 234 (1949) (quoted in Comment, Is Corporate
Criminl Liabilit!y Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 917 (1976)).
64 For a discussion of how the corporation becomes the immediate community of the cor-
porate executive, see M. CtINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 274-75.
65 Letter from Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. to Lammot du Pont, president of E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. (April 15, 1932) (quoted in Mintz & Cohen, Crime in the Suites, in THE CON-
SUMER AND CORPORATE AccouNTA ILrY 79 (R. Nader ed. 1973).
66 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 274 (quoting Madden, Forces which Infhtee
Ethical Behavior, in THE ETHIcs OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 66 (C. Walton ed. 1977)).
67 See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
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that the drive for profit causes immoral behavior is too simplistic. Cor-
porate goals do not exist in isolation from general social goals. Society
values life and so do most corporate executives. In one informal survey,
several corporate officers were of the opinion that no project should go
forward "if even one life is endangered beyond prudent precaution." 68
The problem facing corporate executives is not that they must follow
corporate goals with unswerving allegiance, but that social goals often
conflict. Society values life, but it also values technological progress. In
some situations, the pursuit of progress imposes risks on life. In the sur-
vey noted above, some officers pointed out that endangering activity
such as building bridges is found in all societies, even communist coun-
tries where business does not espouse the profit motive for private gain.69
Whether they are coopted into a corporate atmosphere emphasiz-
ing profit to the exclusion of accepted societal values, or whether they
choose to maximize one of several conflicting social goals, businessmen
may fail to view their conduct that eventually causes danger to lives as
morally blameworthy. In terms of the goals of criminal law, this failure
to envisage conduct as immoral detracts from the deterrent value of an
endangerment offense. Deterrence produced solely by the threat of
criminal sanction will of course have socially desirable results. An en-
dangerment offense structured like section 1617 of the 1979 Act, where
the offense is only as broad as a concurrent violation of other specified
regulatory statutes, 70 will provide added incentive to avoid engaging in
conduct clearly prohibited by certain statutes. However, because corpo-
rate executives do not share a consensus as to the morality of certain life-
endangering behavior not specifically proscribed by statute, such an en-
dangerment offense does not encourage corporate executives to develop
general patterns of conduct which would reduce or eliminate life-endan-
gering risk. Thus, without a moral consensus or mandate, corporate ex-
ecutives will be deterred from certain activity because they fear
68 Nelson T. Bogart, vice-president of Standard Oil of California (quoted in 22 Bus. &
Soc'Y REv. 44, 48 (1977)). The Review sent letters to several corporate executives posing a
hypothetical question involving drilling for oil at sea. The ultimate question was: "How
much in profits is one life worth?" Most of the executives responded that a human life is
priceless and should not be jeopardized knowingly. See, e.g., W.F. Rockwell, Jr., chairman of
Rockwell International ("Certainly no endeavor should be pursued where a life is knowingly
to be lost."). Id. at 47.
69 See, e.g., David P. Reynolds, chairman of the board of Reynolds Aluminum, id. at 45.
Some executives went beyond this view and characterized risk as an inherent and essential
aspect of our free enterprise system. See, e.g., comments of Edgar B. Speer, chairman of U.S.
Steel ("[F]reedom and individual enterprise of people to take risks is vital to the maintenance
and progress of our total society." Id. at 46.) and Richard R. Shinn, president of Metropoli-
tan Life ("[T]he freedom to assume risk, even risk to life, is part and parcel of our basic
freedoms." Id. at 50).
70 See note 42 supra.
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punishment, rather than because they are acting in accordance with a
previously established standard they believe is right.
71
Perhaps a standard of right is difficult for corporate executives to
formulate because society in general finds it difficult to establish a con-
sistent moral code with respect to life-endangering activity. Professor
Sayre observed that "all criminal law is a compromise between two fun-
damentally conflicting interests-that of the public which demands re-
straint of all who injure or menace the social well-being and that of the
individual which demands maximum liberty and freedom from interfer-
ence . "72
Individual freedom and social well-being are two basic but complex
concepts. In a democratic society, freedom means the ability to pursue
economic gain, to acquire property, and to seek happiness as the indi-
vidual pleases. The social good generally encompasses the same ideals
and yet recognizes that unrestrained individual freedom may cause so-
cial harm. Public policy places limitations on freedom. In some cases, a
legislative restriction on individual freedom leads to a readily discern-
able social benefit. Punishing individuals who murder or assault others
serves to promote the social good of security and order. Punishing em-
ployees and manufacturers for unhealthy working conditions, unsafe
products, and environmental pollution also serves a social good. Yet the
restraint on individual freedom attached to this punishment may be
significant. A certain degree of pollution may be attendant on a given
industrial process, but complete eradication of the pollution may be so
economically costly that the industrial process will cease to continue.
73
Our technology may be capable of producing an automobile that is ab-
solutely safe, yet the price of this car may be so great that many mem-
bers of society would be unable to buy one. Thus, by punishing
polluters and automakers for the general good, individuals may be de-
prived of the opportunity to buy desired products or services.
The point at which freedom of activity must be restrained for the
well-being of the larger society will always be open to public debate.
71 Packer argues that the utilitarian approach to deterrence is insufficient. Thus, it is not
enough that individuals refrain from behavior simply because they fear the consequences of
acting in a certain way. Packer emphasizes the "unconscious habitual controls of the law-
abiding," H. PACKER, supra note 50, at 65, which emanate only from a view that prohibited
conduct is immoral. Id. In the corporate context, Stone points out the inability of the law to
shape corporate behavior solely on the basis of utilitarian deterrence and other external con-
trols. ee C. STONE, supra note 12, at 91-110. Stone concludes that some internal control is
preferable so that people "act in socially appropriate ways because they believe it the 'right
thing' to do, rather than because (and thus, perhaps only to the extent that) they are ordered
to do so." Id. at 112.
72 Sayre, supra note 18, at 68.
73 For a discussion of the social costs of totally eliminating socially harmful behavior, see
C. STONE, supra note 12, at 31.
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Such discussion will inevitably balance costs and benefits of a given ac-
tivity to determine its desirability. Section 1617 of the 1979 Act adopted
such a balancing approach with respect to life-endangering activity.
Section 1617 proscribed conduct manifesting an "unjustified disregard"
for human life, which the Judiciary Committee defined as conduct pos-
ing risks which were "wholly disproportionate to the benefit of the con-
duct. ' 74 This standard raises the question of what conduct presents a
harm so disproportionate to its benefit so as to incur the moral blame of
society which will fulfill the morally based criminal goals of deterrence
and retribution.
Many corporate activities involve danger. It is difficult to define
precisely which activities deserve moral condemnation, because it is
often difficult to ascertain the point at which the harm of a particular
activity becomes disproportionate to the benefit. However, some cate-
gories of blameworthiness may be formulated. Several factors deter-
mine in which category particular conduct may become located. First,
activity may be divided, as Irving Shapiro has done, into three types:
unknown risks, known and avoidable risks, known and unavoidable
risks. 75 Second, the continuum encompasses the economic cost of avoid-
ing a risk. Finally, the social cost associated with avoiding a risk must be
considered, where social cost means the unquantifiable burden placed
on the enjoyment and utility of the item.
The threshold question in categorizing activities is whether a given
risk is discoverable. Society would not morally condemn corporations
and individuals for creating an unknown and unforseeable risk. How-
ever, corporations must have a duty to take all reasonable precautions to
discover risks. If a corporation rushes production of a particular item
without thoroughly testing for and solving faults that may cause injury,
the corporation may be subject to moral blame.76 This blameworthiness
is in part evidenced by the decision of Congress to impose, through the
Toxic Substances Control Act, a requirement that manufacturers test
for the harmful and toxic effects of new chemicals. 77
After the risk is discovered, the next question in establishing blame-
74 S. REP. No. 96-553, at 563.
75 Shapiro, supra note 6, at 50.
76 The Firestone radial 500 tire incident presents a possible example of such blame. While
all American tire manufacturers experienced some development problems with producing
radial tires, Firestone was the first company to market such a tire. Firestone itself experienced
more difficulty with the 500 tire than with other steel-belted radials, which it took more time
to develop. Firestone accepted back more 500 tires from its customers and settled more claims
involving the 500 than it did for its other steel-belted radials. See SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra
note 7, at 6. Thus, it may be inferred that the 500 tire's problems stemmed in part from
rushing the tire into production before solving technological problems.
77 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b), 2603 (1976).
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worthiness is whether the risk can be avoided and at what cost. In an-
swering this question, the different categories begin to take shape. In
one category falls activity that is most blameworthy, which may consist
of two primary kinds of conduct. First, failure to prevent cheaply avoid-
able risks is most condemnable. For example, construction laborers
working at great heights are exposed to the possibility of injury upon
falling. Scaffolding and safety lines greatly reduce this risk. As com-
pared to the value of a life or the economic cost scaffolding adds to the
construction project, such safety devices are cheap. In the language of
the endangerment offense, failure to provide safety devices would repre-
sent an unjustified disregard for human life, because the harm of the
conduct (death or serious injury) would be disproportionate to the bene-
fit (economic reduction in cost of buildings constructed without the use
of safety devices). 78
Even though this example may seem blameworthy without conten-
tion, failure to prevent cheaply avoidable risks may not always be crimi-
nally condemnable. Ford Motor Company allegedly could have
reduced the incidence of Pinto fires occurring on rear-end impact with
the installation of an eleven-dollar part. 79 While this lack of prevention
seems morally blameworthy, a twelve-person jury in Indiana acquitted
Ford of reckless homicide charges in the Pinto case.80 While this verdict
may have been the result of certain evidentiary rulings and defense tac-
tics peculiar to the particular trial,8 ' it is disturbing when considered in
a blameworthiness analysis. The benefit involved is an automobile
which many people can afford to purchase. Automobile transportation
is a social good providing enjoyment and personal utility. Indeed, Ford
produced 2,213,700 Pintos between 1971 and 1976.82 The harm caused
by producing fuel systems susceptible to fire is serious death or injury.
Prior to May 1978, twenty-six people died, and twenty-four others were
burned as a result of rear-end collision Pinto fires.83 Whether Ford's
behavior manifested an unjustified disregard for human life turns on
what factors are to be balanced in determining disporportionality. The
78 For a similar example, see People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.
2d 807 (1974), where the court held that a corporation may be indicted for homicide. In that
case, several workers drowned when a coffer dam collapsed. By sustaining the indictment, the
court implied that failure to take safety precautions is culpable.
79 This allegation was made by Mark Dowie. See note 10 suira.
80 N.Y. Times, March 14, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
81 The trial judge limited relevant evidence to internal Ford documents relating to the
testing of the particular model Pinto involved in the accident. Id. § 1, at 16. In addition,
Ford refused to stipulate as to the authenticity of any of its company memoranda, id., a tactic
posing further evidentiary complications for the prosecution.
82 These statistics are reported in SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, sufi-a note 7, at 9.
83 The National Highway Traffic Administration compiled these statistics. See INvE"TI-
GATION REPORT, sufra note 10, at 4 (cited in SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 10).
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incidence of injury compared to number of people driving Pintos does
not appear disproportionate. But if the operative proportion is between
the cost of prevention and incidence of injury, Ford's behavior becomes
unjustified. Certainly many Pinto purchasers would have bought the
car if it had cost eleven dollars more. Ford allegedly did not give its
purchasers this option, but instead calculated that the cost of safety was
not worth the savings in lives.84 While some economic value may be
placed on a life, the cost of the safety improvement could be spread
among purchasers without creating a burden. Thus, Ford's failure to
prevent a cheaply avoidable risk appears morally blameworthy.
A second type of conduct falling into the most blameworthy cate-
gory is that which poses a great degree of danger, yet may still cost a
great deal to avoid. Failing to incur the avoidance expense casts blame
on the actor causing the harm. The Buffalo Creek incident illustrates
such conduct. The mining process produced slag and liquid waste for
disposal. In order to allow the impurities to settle from the water and to
have the water available for future use, the mining company dumped
the slag to form a barrier behind which the water could be stored.8 5
Eventually, the dam collapsed, sending a tidal wave of waste into the
valley below, killing 125 people and destroying a thousand homes.8 6
The harm of the mining company's conduct was death and destruc-
tion of property. The benefit of the activity to society at large was the
production of coal. The inhabitants of the Buffalo Creek area benefited
from the use of streams not directly contaminated by the company's
liquid effluent. The coal company benefited from being able to dispose
of its slag while retaining water for later use in the mining process. In
balancing the proportionality of these benefits against the harm, the
danger was disproportionate to the benefit received by the coal com-
pany. When the destruction of a community is at stake, the risk should
be avoided. In 1974, the company settled a damage suit for thirteen-
and-a-half million dollars. Instead of paying damages, the company
could reasonably have used these monies to reinforce the dam or to find
an alternate means of storing waste water. The company's failure to do
so was unjustified and therefore blameworthy.
A second category of blameworthiness consists of activity in which
the proportionality of benefit and harm may nearly balance. In this
category, defining what conduct manifests an unjustifiable disregard for
life is more difficult. The health hazards associated with asbestos and
84 The Dowie article alleges that Ford made such calculations. See Dowie, supra note 10,
at 51. A Ford official characterized these allegations as distorted and containing half-truths.
SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 10.
85 SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 2.
86 Id. at 3.
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vinyl chloride used in the manufacturing process illustrate this kind of
behavior. Asbestos has more than three thousand commercial applica-
tions,87 but is also associated with significant health risks.88 Similarly,
the vinyl chloride industry accounted for one percent of the gross na-
tional product in 1976, yet this chemical has been associated with liver
cancer in workers and with birth defects.89
The substances present the harm of death or serious illness. How-
ever, society gains the benefit of using fire-resistant products and items
containing plastic. In this case, the harm may not necessarily be dispro-
portionate to the benefit. Here we are confronted with the conflicting
social goals of valuing human life and of social progress. No life should
be sacrificed needlessly, but taking some risks may be a constituent part
of society. If manufacturers adhere to standards which reasonably pro-
tect the health of workers, their conduct cannot be so unjustifiable as to
warrant moral blame simply on the basis of a cost/health balancing
test.90
A final category of blameworthiness consists of conduct which poses
a small but not negligible degree of harm that is very costly to avoid.
No great amount of moral blame attaches to such activity. The prob-
lem of benzene in the workplace, as treated by the Supreme Court in
Industrial Union, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. ,9' provides a recent
example. Several studies had linked benzene with leukemia.92 OSHA
reduced the standard for benzene in the air from ten to one part per
million, a standard costing industry approximately $470 million in in-
vestment and start-up costs and $34 million in annual costs. 93 One in-
87 Id. at 22.
88 Research by Selikoffshowed that by 1973, "444 of the original 632 workers (in the 1943
control group) were dead, a death rate 50 percent greater than expected for the average white
male." Id. at 24 n. 12 (citing Selikoff & Hammond, Multiple Risk Factors in Environmental Cancer,
in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER (J. Fraument, Jr. ed).
89 See note 8 supra.
90 Legislative or administrative bodies may determine what levels of a particular sub-
stance are necessary to protect employee health. Thus, the OSHA standard for asbestos is
now two million fibers per cubic meter of air. SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, supra note 7, at 25. A
violation of such regulations would in itself be morally blameworthy. See Developments in the
Law, supra note 57, at 1237. In order to violate the § 1617 endangerment offense, an actor's
conduct must not only satisfy the elements of § 1617, but must concurrently constitute a
violation of specified regulatory offenses. See note 42 supra. If the actor's conduct does not
satisfy the balancing test embodied in the "unjustified disregard" standard, the actor would
not violate § 1617 even though the actor's conduct violated a regulatory statute. Thus, the
moral blame attached to violating a statute would not by itself suffice to incur blame under
the endangerment offense. However, to the extent that statutes represent a legislative deter-
mination of justifiable conduct, a violation of the regulatory statute may in some instances
represent the kind of unjustifiable conduct the endangerment offense seeks to prohibit.
91 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
92 See id. at 2852 n.9 for a collection of these studies.
93 Id. at 2857. According to the Court, OSHA estimated the "standard will require capi-
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dustry witness testified that the new standard would prevent at most one
leukemia and one other cancer death every six years.9 4 In view of the
cost of implementation and the degree of harm avoided, the Court held
that OSHA had exceeded its rulemaking authority because it could not
demonstrate a reasonable relation between the health hazard and the
adopted standard. The Court stated that the Occupational Health and
Safety Act
was not designed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free work-
places whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is
not great enough to destroy the entire industry. Rather, both the language
and structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicate that it
was intended to require the elimination as far as feasible, of significant
risks of harm.95
Thus, the Court in effect held that conduct which endangers a few, but
which is costly to make safe, is not morally condemnable.
This survey of the categories of corporate activity and moral blame-
worthiness has demonstrated that many factors must go into the balance
of determining when conduct constitutes an unjustified disregard for
human life. Given these complexities, it may be difficult for corpora-
tions, prosecutors, and courts to determine when behavior violates the
offense. However, in some cases, the harm of conduct clearly is disprop-
portionate to the benefit. 96 In these situations, the endangerment of-
fense would provide an added penalty, with deterrent and retributive
effects, for conduct considered morally blameworthy.
C. CULPABILITY AND CORPORATE CONDUCT
Closely associated with the moral blameworthiness characteristic of
criminal law is the requirement of a guilty mind or mens rea. In revising
the endangerment offense, the Judiciary Committee changed the stan-
dard of culpability from reckless 97 to knowledge.98 Considering the spe-
tal investments in engineering control of approximately $266 million, first year operating
costs (for monitoring, medical testing, employee training and respirators) of $187 million to
$205 million and recurring annual costs of $34 million." Id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 5934 (1978)).
94 100 S. Ct. at 2860.
95 Id. at 2864.
96 This class of cases belongs to the "most blameworthy" category described above. See
notes 78-86 & accompanying text supra.
97 The Senate Judiciary Committee summarized the definition of recklessness provided in
S. 1722 as follows:
[A] person is reckless if he is aware of but disregards a substantial risk that a circum-
stance exists or that a result will occur. A substantial risk is defined as a risk the disre-
gard of which constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person
would exercise under the circumstances ...
S. REP. No. 96-553 at 64. See also S. 1722, supra note 1, § 302(c).
98 In summarizing the proposed code's definition of knowing, the Judiciary Committee
explained that such a state of mind exist when the actor "is aware of the nature of his con-
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
cial emphasis our criminal system places on culpability and the social
costs attributable to a lesser standard of culpability, this change appears
to be warranted.
The requirement of scienter has long been an essential characteris-
tic of criminal law. Blackstone stated that "to constitute a crime against
human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlaw-
ful act consequent upon such vicious will." 99 Commenting on public
welfare offenses not requiring scienter, Sayre stated that "mens rea is as
vitally necessary for true crime as understanding is necessary for good-
ness."' 00 In Morissette v. United States, 0'1 the Supreme Court underscored
the importance of mens rea, holding that intent was a necessary element
for any common law crime. But the Morissette Court also recognized
that it had condoned and enforced a category of regulatory offenses not
requiring intent. 0 2 Such statutes generally carried a minimal penalty
and focused upon "achievement of some social betterment rather than
the punishment of crimes as in cases of mala in se. '" 10 3
By imposing criminal liability on life-endangering conduct, Con-
gress would attempt to better society at large. In this sense, endanger-
ment has the characteristic of a malurn prohibitum offense. Yet the scope
of the endangerment offense is limited to morally blameworthy conduct,
so the offense is like malum in se. In order to be penalized as morally
blameworthy, corporate activity must be undertaken with a vicious will.
Indeed, with the exception of a violation of the Food and Drug Act,
criminal penalties for other regulatory offenses require knowing and
willful conduct as an element. 04
In addition to its moral basis, knowledge is the proper standard of
culpability for social policy reasons. The knowledge standard imposes
on corporate leaders the duty to refrain from actions which they actu-
ally know or should know from all the facts available to them will cause
unjustifiable death or injury. Corporate actors must inculcate safety,
health, and ethical considerations into their rational decisionmaking
process. Failure to make these considerations will be morally blamewor-
thy and properly subject to punishment.
duct, he is aware that the requisite circumstances exist, or he is aware or believes that his
conduct is substantially certain to cause the result." S. REP. No. 96-553 at 63. See also S.
1722, supra note 1, § 302(b):
99 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21 (quoted in Sayre, supra note 18, at 55).
100 Sayre, supra note 18, at 56.
101 342 U.S. 246 (1951).
102 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Berhman, 258
U.S. 280 (1922); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
103 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. at 252.
104 See Olds, Unkovic & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties In the Enforcement of the Clear
Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1, 8 (1978).
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Standards of culpability less than knowledge, such as recklessness or
negligence, entail a broader scope of liability. Both recklessness and
negligence depend upon a prevailing reasonable standard of care. This
standard is objective, subject to judicial change over time as the stan-
dard of reasonableness changes.105 Risks and hazards may be accepta-
ble at one point in time, but unreasonable at another. Due to this
changing climate, corporations may take certain actions later found to
be negligent or reckless. This possibility of future liability unnecessarily
chills corporate activity.
A culpability standard of strict liability would cause corporations to
be even more cautious in their activity. In discussing the effect of a strict
liability standard on business conduct, the Supreme Court in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co s pointed out that the uncertainty of
whether a particular activity will be subject to punishment deters busi-
nessmen from engaging in behavior that may be close to the "borderline
of impermissible conduct."' 1 7 The Court noted that for some kinds of
conduct, a requirement evoking excessive caution comports with the
overall statutory scheme. ' 0 8
Certainly the goal of the endangerment offense is to deter socially
harmful conduct. Yet the language of the offense manifests no concern
for excessive caution. By establishing that only conduct exhibiting an
unjustified disregard for human life shall be punishable, the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee recognized that overdeterrence of corporate activity
would have a socially harmful effect. The endangerment offense did not
seek to punish all harmful activity, but only that which posed a risk
disproportionate to the benefit of the activity.
While criminal laws should encourage industry to adhere to a stan-
dard of care, when that standard becomes unreasonably difficult to at-
tain, society as a whole suffers.' 0 9 Our system of government generally
105 See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), where tug boats were lost in a
storm. While some boats at the time carried radio equipment to receive weather reports, the
sunken tugs did not. The tugowners defended liability for the lost cargo on the ground that it
was not an industry custom to carry radio equipment. In finding that the owners fell below
the standard of care, Judge Learned Hand stated for the court: "Indeed in many cases rea-
sonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may
set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages." Id. at 740.
106 438 U.S. 422 (1978). In United States Gypsum, the Court rejected a strict liability stan-
dard for a violation of the antitrust laws.
107 Id. at 441.
108 Id. at 441-42 n.17. The Court had to make this qualification due to its holding in
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), that corporate officers were strictly liable for a
violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
109 An unreasonable standard would be one for which it is economically unfeasible for
corporations to observe so that the cost of observance significantly increased the cost of or
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envisages that democractic institutions will establish standards of behav-
ior after gathering views from all sectors of society to determine the opti-
mal standard. A culpability requirement of knowledge requires
corporations to act in accordance with the due care standards estab-
lished by administrative agencies and legislative bodies. Thus, for social
policy reasons, knowledge is a preferable standard of culpability for an
endangerment offense.
III. APPLYING THE ENDANGERMENT OFFENSE TO CORPORATIONS
In considering the effectiveness of a federal endangerment offense
as it relates to corporations, a discussion of whether punishment of this
activity conforms with the theoretical and moral purposes of criminal
law constitutes only part of the inquiry. Morally blameworthy conduct
may be the proper subject of criminality, but labelling conduct as crimi-
nal will serve no purpose unless the threat of sanction has actual mean-
ing for the actor and society, and unless the offense is constructed so as
to reach the proper range and types of conduct.
The endangerment offense presents two primary practical
problems. First, even though it may be theoretically appealing to deter
corporate behavior by punishment, the peculiar organizational nature
of a corporate wrongdoer may dampen the actual deterrent effect of
punishment. Second, while Part II discussed what conduct, in terms of
moral blameworthiness, exhibited an unjustified disregard for human
life, the specific scope of the endangerment offense remains to be consid-
ered.
As a preface to answering these questions, the judicial treatment of
corporations and corporate officers in the criminal context should first
be reviewed briefly in order to demonstrate some of the special problems
arising in the corporate context.
A. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE CORPORATION AND ITS EMPLOYEES
As corporate activity increased in the nineteenth century, criminal
law had to develop a means for dealing with harm caused under the
auspices of the corporate form. Criminally penalizing a corporation
posed theoretical problems since the corporation is an artificial entity
which exists only in accordance with the laws of its state of incorpora-
tion.110 Indeed, at common law, the artificial nature of the corporation
ended altogether the cost of the industrial enterprise. See notes 73, 87-95 & accompanying
text supra.
110 See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). See also
Laugham, The Law and the Corporate Polluter. Flexibility andAdaption in the Developing Law of the
Environment, 23 MERCER L. REv. 571, 589-90 (1972).
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prevented it from incurring criminal liability.'1 '
In order to overcome the obstacle of artificiality, the law first
equated the corporation with a natural person. 112 Since a corporation
acts only through its human agents, courts then found corporations vi-
cariously liable for the acts of their agents. 13 In New York Cent. &Hudson
River R.R. Co. v. United States, 114 the Supreme Court first applied this tort
principle to the criminal context. The Court held that corporations are
liable for the acts of their agents, undertaken within the scope of their
authority, which violate specific statutory proscriptions. Public policy
mandated this result since allowing corporations to avoid liability would
mean that "many offenses would go unpunished and acts be committed
in violation of law, where. . . the statute requires all persons, corporate
and private, to refrain from certain practices forbidden in the interest of
public policy." 115 The Court concluded that immunizing corporations
from criminal liability "would virtually take away the only means of
effectually controlling the subject matter and correcting the abuses
aimed at it." 116 Following New York Central, courts now regularly im-
pute criminal liability to a corporation for the acts of employees done on
behalf of the corporation and within the scope of the actor's author-
ity. 117
New York Central involved the violation of a regulatory offense that
did not require willfulness or knowledge as an element. Theoretically, it
is impossible for an artificial entity with no mind or soul to have mens rea
so as to incur moral guilt. Apparently guided by the undesirable policy
consequences of freeing corporations from liability, the Court in United
States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. ,118 did not attempt to solve this theoretical
engima and summarily found that a corporation could be civilly liable
for willfully failing to comply with statutory requirements. The Court
later applied the concept of corporate willfulness to criminal law in
111 Blackstone stated that a "corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime,
in its corporate capacity: though its members may in their distinct individual capacities."
EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 106 (J. Ehrlich ed. 1959).
112 See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which provides that "the words 'person' and 'whoever'
include corporations. . . as well as individuals."
113 See Mueller, supra note 54, at 40.
114 212 U.S. 481 (1904).
115 Id. at 495.
116 Id. at 495-96.
117 See, e.g., United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 915 (1963); Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788
(1943).
118 303 U.S. 239 (1938).
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United States v. A & P Trucking Co. 119 Although that case involved the
liability of partnership, the Court used language applicable to all busi-
ness entities:
The treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the fruits of
violations which are committed knowingly by agents of the entity in the
scope of their employment. Thus pressure is brought on those who own
the entity to see to it that their agents abide by the law.120
After A &P Trucking, federal courts upheld the convictions of cor-
porations for offenses requiring knowledge. 12 1 Courts have also held
that corporations may be indicted for homicide for deaths resulting from
the acts or omissions of employees. 122
Corporate officers and agents may be subject to personal criminal
liability for acts they perform for their employing corporation. Since
most criminal statutes proscribe conduct done by "any person," officers
cannot use their employment relation to shield themselves from liability.
According to principles of accomplice liability, when a corporation en-
gages in illegal activity, corporate officers directing the conduct become
criminally liable.' 23 In addition, corporate employees may incur indi-
rect liability for aiding and abetting 124 another employee to commit 125
an offense. 126
119 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
120 Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
121 See, .g., United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975); Boise Dodge,
Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1969); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States,
330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Gibson Products, 426 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Tex.
1976).
122 United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (2d Cir. 1904); People v. Ebasco Services,
Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974); Commonwealth v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,
152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W. 459 (1913); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88
N.E. 22 (1909).
123 "[A]II those who may be said to have directed or caused the actor to do the act, or to
have participated in accomplishing the result, may be treated as the actors." NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWs, I WORKING PAPERS 183
(1970) [hereinafter cited as I WORKING PAPERS].
124 The current federal criminal code imposes liability upon anyone who "aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of an offense, and upon anyone
who "willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be an
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), (b) (1978).
125 1 WORKING PAPERS, suipra note 123, at 183.
126 The standards and scope of strict liability are somewhat different. In United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Court held that chief executive officers could be personally
liable for violations by subordinate employees of a strict liability statute. The Court stated
that an officer will be prima facie liable when the officer "by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to
correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so." Id. at 673-74. The Court
imposed a duty of "foresight and vigilance," but did not "require that which is objectively
impossible." Id. at 673. The lower federal courts interpreting Parkr objective impossibility
defense have construed the scope of the defense narrowly. See United States v. Hata & Co.,
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B. DETERRENCE, RETRIBUTION AND IMPOSING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CORPORATIONS AND EMPLOYEES
In order to shape corporate conduct, the threat of criminal sanc-
tions must actually deter corporations from acting in the proscribed
manner. In implementing statutory offenses, courts have upheld the
criminal convictions of corporations on the presumption that the corpo-
rate entity would respond on the threat of criminal sanctions in the
same way as would an individual. Thus, in both New York Central 27 and
A &P Tmcking,' 28 the Supreme Court indicated that punishment of the
corporation would cause corporate owners and directors to alter modes
of behavior so as not to violate the law. Personal punishment of these
same corporate agents presumably serves the same deterrent function.
Even if punishment did not effect deterrence, sanctions might serve a
retributive purpose. In order for an offense punishing life-endangering
conduct to be effective, the goals of deterrence and retribution must be
attainable in the corporate context. However, characteristics of corpo-
rations affect the analysis of whether criminal sanctions achieve these
goals.
Deterring the Corporation
In order for any sanction to serve as a deterrent, it must truly pun-
ish the offender. A corporation cannot be imprisoned, so punishment is
limited to the social stigma attached to the fact of conviction and to the
levy of a fine. To be effective, these penalties must force the corporation
to alter its operating structure so as to avoid future criminal behavior.
As with individuals, the social opprobrium attached to a criminal
conviction acts as a deterrent for corporations. A corporation's image is
important to its employees, shareholders, and consumers. Since a crimi-
nal prosecution diminishes the corporation's standing with these groups,
criminal sanctions become undesirable.1 29 Thus, in seeking to avoid
conviction for reckless homicide for the Pinto deaths of three girls, Ford
Motor Company spent in litigation expenses an estimated one million
dollars to escape a possible $30,000 penalty. 30
A second motivation for corporations to conform their behavior to
statutory requirements is the threat of fine. The levy of fines rests on the
presumption that corporations act -to maximize profits and that the
Ltd., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976). Thus,
for strict liability offenses, corporate officers are exposed to significant liability.
127 212 U.S. 481.
128 358 U.S. 121.
129 See Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 78-79
(1976).
130 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 261.
[Vol. 72
CRIMINAL CODE SYMPOSIUM
threat to financial well-being.will cause corporations to avoid penalties.
Some commentators have challenged this thesis by pointing out that
corporations go through various life-cycles. Once a corporation becomes
established, profit maximization becomes of secondary importance, and
the corporation seeks longer range goals, such as growth, increased mar-
ket share, and improved social image.13' Even if corporations do not
always act as profit-maximizers, profit is the raison d'etre of corporate
existence. A large or proportionate fine will eventually affect the corpo-
rate decisionmaking calculus.
Fines are often ineffective because they are so small that corpora-
tions may write them off as a cost of doing business. For example, in
1972, Chevron Corporation paid a fine of one million dollars for viola-
tion of offshore pollution laws, but "the financial statement of Standard
Oil of California, Chevron's parent, shows that the fine was about .03
percent of the company's gross income (about the same as a $10 traffic
ticket for a person making $25,000 a year.)" 132 Fines of even moderate
size will affect corporate behavior. A corporation cannot always pass
the cost of fines on to consumers because it will face a competitive disad-
vantage in the market by raising its prices. 133 Of course, a million-dollar
fine for a small corporation would be an effective penalty. Thus, smaller
companies face more severe punishment than a larger corporation for
conduct inflicting the same amount of harm.
In order to give fines a truly penal effect, judges should have the
option of adjusting the size of the fine to the ability of the corporation to
pay and to the magnitude of the harm caused. The proposed 1979 Act
set one million dollars as the maximum fine for a corporation. 134 While
such a fine may not significantly penalize a large business, it does pose a
real threat to a smaller corporation. S. 1722 gave judges the power to
increase fines by ordering restitution of medical expenses to victims. 135
Where the damage of corporate conduct is widespread and quantifiable,
such a sentencing power vests judges with the ability to levy compensa-
tory monetary judgments on corporate defendants which would greatly
increase the cost of illegal behavior.
Opponents of imposing liability on corporations argue that fines
merely hurt innocent shareholders by removing dividends and reducing
stock value. 136 However, since buying stock is always a risk, it is fair
131 For a brief summary of these theories, see id. at 47; C. STONE, supra note 12, at 37-39.
132 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 125 (quoting B. SHOSTAK, MODERN So-
CIAL REFORMS 246 (1974)).
133 Mueller, supra note 54, at 27.
134 See S.' 1722, supra note 1, § 2201(b)(2).
135 See S. 1722, supra note 1, § 2006 (a)(1). See also S. REP. No. 96-553 at 952.
136 See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Homicide, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 911 (1979).
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that shareholders should lose money due to managerial misconduct. 137
To the extent that criminal fines reduce profit, they are not different
from managerial mismanagement, which may reduce profits through
civil damage judgments. 138 If shareholders are injured by the levy of
fines, they may be more likely to exercise their ability to elect accounta-
ble and responsible corporate officers and directors. 39
Conviction and punishment by fine will only be effective if the cor-
porate organization can respond to the threat of punishment and alter
its behavioral patterns before the illegal conduct occurs. In his work on
illegal corporate activity, Stone argued that sanctions will not deter un-
less top executives know of improper conduct by their subordinates and
are able to do something about the impropriety. Stone contended that
the organizational structure of corporations, with its inherent conflicting
interests between different departments and levels of authority, pre-
vented executives from gaining knowledge and acting.140
While Stone's observations may be correct, the threat of an effective
sanction may motivate corporate directors to make organizational
changes. By establishing clear channels of communication and responsi-
bility and by implementing operating procedures, corporations may de-
sign an organizational structure that will encourage and force employees
to act lawfully. 141 Thus, if confused lines of authority now benefit indi-
viduals in the corporation by obscuring responsibility, placing great ex-
ternal pressure on the corporation by the threat of fine will cause it to
modify its internal operating procedures. 142 Without the mask of organ-
ization, corporate agents will be exposed and thereby motivated to act
lawfully.
Deterring Corporate Employees
If fines cannot deter the corporation, punitive action taken directly
137 Geis argued that the "purchase of corporate stock is always both an investment and a
gamble; the gamble is that the corporation will prosper by whatever tactics of management
its chosen officers pursue." Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPO-
RATE AccOuNTABILrry, supra note 65, at 347. See also Elkins, supra note 129, at 82.
138 See Comment, supra note 63, at 920-21.
139 Mueller points out that the threat of sanction may cause shareholders "to be meticu-
lously careful in the selection and supervision of the managerial agents." Mueller, supra note
54, as 39. However, he argued that this deterrent may have little practical effect because
shareholders may have no real say in choosing the responsible management. Id.
140 C. STONE, supra note 12, at 44.
141 Fisse notes that when a corporation commits a crime of noncompliance or of omission,
"a breakdown in large-scale organizational arrangements is especially likely to involve corpo-
rate as opposed to individual negligence." Fisse, sura note 60, at 390. See also Note, Decision-
making Modes and Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
142 Fisse asserts that "holding a corporation responsible for an offense creates some pressure
upon it to apply and develop an internal discipline system without committing the law to any
particular type of intervention or supervision." Id. at 386.
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against the individual decisionmakers might shape behavior. Unlike the
artificial entity, corporate officers can be imprisoned in addition to be-
ing fined. As Geis has observed, "j]ail terms have a self-evident deter-
rent impact upon corporate officials, who belong to a social group that is
exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and censure." 143 Corporate
executives jailed in the electrical pricefixing conspiracy of the early
1960s stated that incarceration had profoundly affected their lives. 144 In
addition to incarceration, executives may also be fined, which may have
a penal effect depending on the relative size of the fine.
While both imprisonment and fines serve as potentially effective
deterrent sanctions, neither can actually serve that function. Indeed, it
is difficult to convict responsible individuals in the first instance. The
diffusion of policymaking throughout a corporate organizational struc-
ture increases the difficulty of identifying particular responsible individ-
uals.145 If the employees are identified, they may not be within the
personal jurisdiction of the forum where the corporate harm material-
ized. 46 When individuals are indicted as codefendants with the corpo-
ration, the defendants often negotiate a plea with the district attorney
whereby the corporation agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere in ex-
change for dismissal of the charges against the individuals.
When convictions do occur, penalties are not severe. In a recent
study, Clinard and Yeager found that "of 56 convicted executives of
large corporations, 62.5 percent received probation, 21.4 percent had
their sentences suspended, and 28.6 percent were incarcerated."' 147
When judges require executives to serve some sentence, the period is
usually short. Clinard and Yeager observed that
[i]n 1975 and 1976 a total of 16 executives of 582 corporations were sen-
tenced to a total of 594 days of actual imprisonment (an average of 37.1
days each). Of the total days of imprisonment, 360 (60.6 percent) were
143 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, .supra note 5, at 292 (quoting Geis, supra note 137, 182-83).
144 Geis reports that during Senate hearings on heavy electrical equipment pricefixing, a
former General Electric executive stated, "'they would never get me to do it again. . . . I
would 'starve before I would do it again. . . .'" Geis also noted that another executive was
asked, "'Suppose your superior tells you to resume the meetings; will they be resumed?' 'No,
sir,' he answered with feeling. 'I would leave the company rather than participate in the
meetings again.'" Geis, supra note 137, at 349.
145 Fisse, supra note 60, at 372-73, 390.
146 Id. at 380.
147 M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 5, at 287. The authors compiled these figures
during a "systematic analysis of federal administrative, civil and criminal actions either initi-
ated or completed by 25 federal agencies. . . against the 477 largest publicly-owned manu-
facturing. . . corporations in the United States during 1975 and 1976." Id. The authors
note that these conviction and sentencing figures exceed 100 percent because "some offenders
received a partially suspended sentence and probation." Id. at 287 n.11.
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accounted for by two officers, who received six months each in the same
case.
14 8
When serving time in jail becomes a remote possibility due to suspended
or short sentences, the threat of incarceration has little deterrent value.
If corporate executives do not fear incarceration, only the social
stigma of conviction remains as a deterrent. However, while convicted
executives may lose status in the community, they may not lose their
livelihood. In contrast to many felons who lose their employment, con-
victed executives often retain their position with the company or draw
pensions. 149 Those who are discharged from a company may often be
hired by other corporations in the same industry.15 0 This postconviction
employment certainly reduces the impact of criminal sanctions, under-
mining the goal of deterrence.
Criminal Conviction and Retribution
Even if criminal sanctions do not completely fulfill a deterrence
function, the imposition of penalties serves some retributive purpose.
Society necessarily becomes outraged at corporate activity which unjus-
tifiably endangers the health and safety of employees, consumers, and
the public. Individual members of society have little private recourse
against corporations. Some people may choose not to engage in hazard-
ous occupations; yet in many areas a local industry may be the primary
source of employment. Individuals may boycott certain consumer
goods, yet some products may be unsafe on an industrywide basis so that
the consumer has a choice between using an unsafe product or none at
all. Individuals may be unable to escape air pollution, potential radia-
tion, or toxic chemical hazards. The inability of the individual to affect
corporate behavior motivated Congress to enact regulatory laws. Pun-
ishment of violators of these laws serves to help maintain public confi-
dence in the efficacy of rule by law. 15 1
C. THE SCOPE OF AN EFFECTIVE ENDANGERMENT OFFENSE
Unjustifiable life-endangering conduct, being morally blamewor-
thy, is a proper subject for punishment under the criminal law. If fines
are levied proportionate to the magnitude of the harm caused and to the
corporation's ability to pay, criminal sanctions will deter corporations
from engaging in life-endangering activity. The final inquiry in assess-
ing the Senate Judiciary Committee's endangerment offense is whether
148 Id. at 291.
149 Id. at 295.
150 Id. at 296.
151 See notes 59-61 & accompanying text supra.
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the offense is constructed so as to effectively prohibit and properly pun-
ish morally blameworthy life-endangering activity.
In the final draft of S. 1722, the Senate Judiciary Committee set
forth three instances in which federal jurisdiction would exist for viola-
tion of the endangerment offense. First, the offense must be committed
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States, including fed-
eral enclaves. 152 Second, the offense occurs during the commission of
any other offense proscribed by the Federal Criminal Code.153 Third,
the imminent danger is created by conduct constituting a violation of
specified regulatory offenses.154 This list of regulatory statutes replaced
a broad designation of any "statute ...designed to protect public
health or safety."' 55 The committee made this replacement in order to
reduce uncertainty as to what conduct would be culpable under the en-
dangerment offense. In creating certainty, the committee unduly re-
stricted the scope of the endangerment offense.
When statutes criminalize conduct, constitutional due process re-
quires that the terms of the statute "be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties."' 156 A criminal statute must not be so vague that
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."1 57
These constitutional requirements generally apply to conduct that
the actor may not previously know is criminal. But life-endangering ac-
tivity is malurn in se. In this sense, such activity would fall under the
second jurisdictional category of the endangerment offense along with
other common law crimes presently codified in title 18 of the United
States Code. 158 If life-endangering conduct is treated as malum in se, the
conduct causing the imminent danger need not also be limited to a spec-
ified regulatory offense. Malurn in se offenses require only general in-
tent.' 59 Therefore, the result of death or injury would be sufficient to
152 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 564.
153 Id. The committee described this jurisdictional branch as reaching "every other offense
in title 18 except offenses, such as the espionage or securities laws, that are described by cross-
reference." Id.
154 Id. See also note 42 supra.
155 S. REP. No. 96-553 at 564.
156 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939) (quoting Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
157 306 U.S. at 453.
158 The Federal Criminal Code presently punishes murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111(1976)) and
manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1976)).
159 LaFave and Scott note that general intent is sometimes used "to mean the general
notion ofmmr rea." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 201 (1972). These authors also
point out "[i]t has been said that a crime of which a criminal intent [mens rea] is an element is
malub inse. . . ." Id. at 29.
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render corporations criminally liable. Exposing corporations to such a
broad liability would be consistent with the value our society places on
human life and with the moral blame society casts upon those who take
life away.
However, not all death is punishable. Criminal law recognizes that
some homicides are excusable or justifiable. 160 Similarly, in a modern
technological society, some risk of death is unavoidable or may not be
practically avoided. By enacting regulatory statutes that specify allowa-
ble behavior, Congress has in effect decided which deaths caused by the
industrial process are to be excusable. Viewed from this perspective,
'limiting the scope of an endangerment offense to concurrent violations
of regulatory statutes is the most practical public policy.
However, the Judiciary Committee's list of these regulatory statutes
is incomplete. The committee omitted such statutes as the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 161 and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act.162 Each of these laws regulates activity with life-endanger-
ing potential. Any effective endangerment offense should encompass a
knowing violation of these existing statutes.
CONCLUSION
Corporate activity that harms employees, consumers, and the envi-
ronment presents society -and lawmakers with a complex policy ques-
tion. Some corporate conduct presents a risk of harm disproportionate
to the benefit of that conduct. Such activity is morally blameworthy
and within the ambit of criminal law. An endangerment offense, like
section 1617 of the 1979 Act, which embodies a balancing of the risk and
benefit of a particular activity, would properly punish and deter such
blameworthy acts. However, considering that conduct may simultane-
ously benefit many sectors of society and that assigning weight to each
factor in the balance may be difficult, the determination of when con-
duct manifests an unjustified disregard for human life presents no easy
task for corporations, prosecutors, and judges.
When society can agree that a particular activity is socially harm-
ful, criminal punishment serves to deter actors from engaging in further
160 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-5 (1979) (peace officers may justifiably use force
likely to cause death or bodily harm when an officer believes that it is reasonably necessary to
prevent death or harm to others).
161 15 U.S.C. § 2051 etseq. (1972). Section 2070 of this statute prescribes criminal penalties
for a willfull and knowing violation of the statute's prohibited acts, listed in 15 U.S.C. § 2068.
162 15 U.S.C. § 1381 el seq. (1966). While this law only provides civil penalities for non-
compliance (15 U.S.C. § 1398), holding persons criminally liable for willfully violating the
statute's proscription which also constitutes an unjustifiable disregard for human life would
be consistent with the legislative scheme established in the endangerment defense.
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similar conduct. In the corporate context, criminal sanctions will have
an actual deterrent effect if judges are empowered to impose fines pro-
portionate to the actual damage a corporation causes and to its ability
to pay.
While it is not without difficulty, the endangerment offense repre-
sents a laudable attempt to deal with the problem of socially harmful
conduct. Such an offense, specifying a broader range of regulatory of-
fenses as part of its prohibitions, should be included in future efforts to
reform the federal criminal law.
